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COMMENT:
EXACTLY BACKWARDS:
EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
R. Polk Wagner'

First of all, I want to thank in particular Craig Nard for invit
ing me to this conference, and to Dan Burk and Mark Lemley for
embarking upon a very interesting project.
I
We meet today in an era of accelerating technological devel
opment, of the ballooning use of patents as both shields and
swords in the marketplace, and increasing criticism of the courts'
ability to meaningfully deal with these changes.

Given this, it

would seem to be the rare and unique patent scholar whose respon
sive policy prescriptions center around unbounded policy-oriented
judicial interventions into various details of the patent law.
Professors Burk and Lemley, however, are such patent schol
ars.

Their basic premise is that the judiciary-in particular the

Federal Circuit-should embrace and extend a trend towards tech
nology-specific rules that they argue is a major feature of modern
patent law. That is, they argue that judicially-created technologi
cal-exceptionalism-in which every technology, every industry,
has its own set of rules and procedures, and in which patents are
evaluated on different bases-will address the challenges of the
current U.S. patent system.

I will make three points in this brief response to their pro
posal.

The first two address Burk and Lemley's descriptive claim

that the patent Jaw is increasingly exhibiting a fundamental tech-
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nological-exceptionalism. That is, I first suggest that this trend is
counterfactual to the reality of the current patent law.

Second, I

argue that the trend in fact runs counter to some major trends we
see across the patent law. And finally, I consider the public policy
questions raised by Burk and Lemley's call for judicially-created
technological-exceptionalism,

concluding

that-even

assuming

they are descriptively correct-the dominant approach is exactly
backwards of the one they advocate.
II
First let's look at whether technological-exceptionalism is
counterfactual.

An initial problem here is that it's really tough to

figure out what is meant by technology-specific rules. 1 This is
Professor Janis's point? He says: Of course! The patent laws are
unquestionably technology-specific. That's by design.

That's the

whole point. The key is, then, to distinguish between two different
3
versions of technological-specificity.
The first I call micro
exceptionalism, which occurs when the same rules are applied to
different technological facts and yield different results. This is the
normal course of things, the way we think of the patent law: gen
erally uniform rules, applied to very different technological facts,
mediated by the patent law's ubiquitous "person having ordinary
skill in the art" standard.
Although they fail to address the distinction, Professors Burk
and Lemley discuss a far different form of exceptionalism: macro
exceptionalism, distinct rules or standards applied to different
technological facts. This version creates not only technologically
variable results, but also industry-variable results.

Professors

Burk and Lemley explicitly claim that biotechnology is different
than software and should be treated differently, and different sorts
4
of rules and procedures should thus be developed. It's important
to understand that this is a vision of a very different sort of patent
law than the micro-exceptionalism that is the conventional under
standing. One problem with Burk and Lemley's descriptive effort

1
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is trying to tease out-when you look at the actual cases-what the
Federal

Circuit

exceptionalists?

is

doing:

Are

the

judges

being

macro

Are they really trying to do something distinctly

different, or is this the ordinary run of patent law wherein similar
rules are applied to different sets of technological facts to yield
somewhat different results?
The second consideration, which is a very specific and per
haps the most original proposal Professors Burk and Lemley make,
is to vary the person having ordinary skill in the art ("PHOSIT A")
in order to adjust the scope of the claim depending on the particu
5
lar technology. Table 1 below illustrates this.

Table 1
PHOSITA
Level

Obviousness
Standard

High

higher

(easy field)

(lots of things

[software]

are obvious)

Low

lower

(hard field)

(fewer things

[biotech]

are obvious)

Disclosure
Standard

ScopeEffects

ScopeEffects

(disclosure)

(equivalents)

narrower

broader

indeterminate

broader

narrower

indeterminate

Scope-Effects
(obviousness)

lower
(needn't
disclose as
much)
higher
(must disclose
quite
specifically)

The Indeterminate Effects of the PHOSITA Standard
A serious flaw in this proposal is that the variation of the PHO
SITA standard has, ultimately, indeterminate effects on patent
scope. For example, look to the first row in Table 1 above, where
the PHOSITA standard is high, which means it is a relatively
"easy" field (e.g., software).

The obviousness standard will be

somewhat higher, because many things are then obvious in that
field.

As a result, the disclosure requirement will be lower.

The

scope effects of the obviousness standard in this case will yield
narrower patent claims: Because of the amount of obvious infor
mation, the claim will have to be narrower to avoid the prior art.
Conversely, the disclosure requirements here will yield broader
claims: The claim can be broader without disclosing the underly
ing invention quite as much.

The scope effects with respect to

equivalence, which under the doctrine combines both these effects,

/d.

at 736.
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are indeterminate.
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Whether a high level or low level of ordinary

skill in the art ultimately results in broader or narrower patents
depends on what one thinks about the balance between at least
these three, and perhaps more, factors.

Thus the scope effects of

varying the PH OS IT A standard are fundamentally indeterminate as
a general matter, and are likely to be impossible to figure out even
on a case-by-case basis.

Obviously, one can make assumptions

and try to determine the effects, but I think it is quite troublesome
to do so.
Third, there are several alternative explanations for what is
going on in biotechnology-the field that Burk and Lemley point
to as the primary example of technological-exceptionalism. 7

For

instance, one alternative explanation is that the jurisprudential
dataset is characterized by a very small sample size; there are not
many cases that deal directly with this.
nation is judicial consistency.

Another alternative expla

Shockingly, one judge,

Judge

Lourie, has authored almost all of the major opinions noted by
Burk and Lemley as relevant to biotechnology; thus, one explana
tion for the unusual patterns is that 1 udge Lourie could be a very
consistent judge.
A third alternative explanation is factual error.

Perhaps the

Federal Circuit is just wrong-Burk and Lemley note this in their
8
The Federal Circuit may

article, but set it aside as an explanation.

simply be wrong about the ordinary skill in the art level of differ
ent fields and continue to be wrong.
A fourth alternative explanation is fact-versus-law confusion.

The court, at some point, might have said something that was fac
tually based
now

the

on

judges

biotechnology, or about computer software, and
are

confused about what is fact and what is law.

For whatever reason, the court may continue to follow this fact
that was put in place a long time ago without changing, such that it
looks like the court is on a macro-exceptionalist mission when, in

fact it is just confused.
Importantly, however, each of these explanations suggests
that any current exceptionalism is extremely unlikely to persist
(even �lit currently exists). It is not at all clear to me, even if you
read the cases exactly as Professors Burk and Lemley do, that one
can determine with any confidence that macro-exceptionalism, as
opposed to micro-exceptionalism, is developing.
"

For further exposition on this point. see Wagner,

pra note L at 1348-50.
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III
The second major concern I have regarding the Burk/Lemley
thesis is that their argument that technological-specificity is an
emerging trend in the patent law appears directly counter to clear,
verifiable jurisprudential trends at the Federal Circuit.
First, I have done a lot of work recently on claim construc
9
In their earlier discussions, the judges alluded to some of
tion.
that work.

The trend that I find suggests clear movement towards

rule-based unifvrmity, not standards-based disuniformity.

Figure 1
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The Federal Circuit's Trend Towards Rules-Based Claim
Construction10
In Figure 1 , the y-axis represents the frequency of what I call
the "holistic" methodological approach to claim construction. This
is a largely standards-based (as opposed to rules-based) approach,
whereas the alternative approach-"proceduralism"-is far more
rules-oriented. Figure 1 shows a statistically significant trend over
time of the Federal Circuit becoming more uniformly rules-based.
Second, I am involved in another ongoing project analyzing
all of the Federal Circuit's en bane decisions. It is very interesting

9
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to line up, as I did in Table 2, the last ten years of patent en bane
decisions.

Table 2

Johnson &

unclaimed does limit

Johnston
RhonePoulenc
Festa
Midwest
Industries

2002
2000

1999

In re Zurko

1998

Cybor

1998

Case-by-case PHE

Rule: complete

surrender

surrender

Patent-state law

Patent-state law

conflicts analyzed

conflicts analyzed

under regional

under Federal

circuit law

Circuit law

PTO fact-finding reviewed for clear error

ence to district
courts

1998

No

Case-specific

Split: limited defer-

Nobelpharma

Yes

equivalents

Rule: no deference,
pure law issue

Patent-antitrust

Patent-antitrust

interface decided

interface decided

according to re-

according to Fed-

I law

Yes

/

Yes

/

No
Yes

Yes

eral Circuit law

Hilton-Davis

1995

DOE issues

No

Rite-Hite

1995

Patent damages issues

No

Markman

1995

struction as issue

Split: claim con-

Rule: claim con-

Yes

for·

In re Alappat
In re
Donaldson

1994

PTO procedures/subject matter

No

1994

PTO must use 112/6

No

Federal Circuit En Bane Trends
Examination of the cases in which the Federal Circuit court
has either clarified or changed the law reveals that the court is
moving towards uniform rules. Table 2 lists the en bane decisions
in which there is a change-a shift in the doctrinal orientation
and it demonstrates that the court is moving more towards rules.
Any artifacts Professors Burk and Lemley pick up that suggest the
court is moving away from uniformity would be counter to the ac
tual evidence of a broader project going on at the Federal Circuit
right now, both in the claim construction area and in a variety of
other areas as seen through the en bane analysis.
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This type of data-driven project on en bane procedures sug
gests that the written description requirement is being targeted.
The best predictor, when considering all the patent cases going en
bane, is denials of motions to rehear en bane prior to the case be
ing taken en bane.

Right now we have four judges on record to

take the written description issue en bane.

If you look at this,

some of the recent major en bane cases suggest that at some point
this issue is going to be taken en bane. The trend demonstrated in
Table 2 suggests that the Federal Circuit is not heading in the di
rection that Professors Burk and Lemley want, but in precisely the
opposite

direction-towards a more rules-based,

uniform ap

proach.
IV
Finally, I want to take this opportunity to address some policy
arguments. Professors Burk and Lemley make the basic point that
exceptionalism allows for policy-based interventions to ameliorate
(what they consider to be) industry problems in biotechnology
overlapping rights and transactions costs.

11

Their solution is to

adjust the PH OS IT A standard to allow for broader but fewer pat
12
ents.
As an initial matter, this argument raises a fatal indeterminacy
problem similar to that which I noted above: Broader patents are
going to spur more patents, not fewer patents.

So it is not clear

how anyone expects achieve the Burk/Lemley goal of fewer pat
ents while simultaneously broadening their scope.

This apparent

logical disconnect alone raises troubling questions.
Second, there are other problems with exceptionalism that
have already been noted to some degree by other commentators,
namely the virtually intractable information and game-playing
problems.

We already see this, of course, in patent prosecutors.

Whenever there is a line drawn, rational patent prosecutors want to
straddle it; that strategy gives litigators the most flexibility in the
future.

So, because exceptionalism involves the ever more de

tailed drawing of fine lines, one has to expect an explosion

m

game playing.
Third, there are issues concerning the political economy of
specialized patent law.

One can imagine the special interest

groups, the political economy issues that will arise once patent law
begins to be disaggregated into all its component parts.

Obvi

ously, this will increase complexity and uncertainty enormously.
11
12

Burk & Lemley. supra note 4, at 722.
This is the Burk/Lemley punch line for biotechnology.

/d. at 737.
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After twenty

years, the Federal Circuit is finally trying to reach some sort of
common set of rules for claim construction.

The prospect of hav

ing to repeat this process for dozens of legal issues in dozens of
different technological areas is a deeply troubling aspect of the
Burk/Lemley proposal.
Finally, note that the Burk/Lemley scheme is a virtually per
fect indictment of itself.

Their argument is that the Federal Cir

cuit, by creating an exceptionalist biotechnology jurisprudence,
has it exactly backwards: narrow and numerous patents causing
transaction costs.

In response, they suggest we ask the Federal

Circuit to engage in
tionalism.

even more

open-ended, policy-driven excep

Certainly the evidence to date suggests that this is not

something the court is going to do well at all.
Finally, I note that the transaction costs of overlapping rights
are potential problems not at all unique to biotechnology.

One

could adopt a different approach-clarify the rights-and go ex
actly the other direction. Instead of being disaggregated and com
plex, be simple and clear; the initial allocations matter less.

Peo

ple can, in individual industries, tailor their rights with each other
to deal with these industry-specific issues.

A big part of my pro

posal is the development of uniform, not disaggregated, rules.
Some of the projects I am working on suggest this is what is going
on at the Federal Circuit right now-though of course only in fits
and starts.

We are not there yet, and this obviously is not a com

plete solution.

While it may not eliminate costs, it is far more at

tractive in a sort of second-best world than the exceptionalist ap
proach. Perhaps most importantly, the suggested solution does not
depend on the Federal Circuit's ability to develop policy, for
which the court does not have a good record thus far.
It may be that the Federal Circuit's trend is in the right direc
tion and biotechnology jurisprudence is the laggard, not the inno
vation. In that sense, I would suggest that it is not the Federal Cir
cuit that has it exactly backwards.
Thank you.

